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1 Introduction
Do capital market imperfections (CMI for short) increase inequality and in-
tergenerational mobility? Are CMI a barrier to mobility? A huge literature
has been devoted to the implication of asymmetries of information on the dis-
tribution of income and intergenerational mobility (Becker and Tomes (1986),
Maoz and Moav (1999), Mulligan (1996), Loury (1981), Owen and Weil (1998)).
These papers tell us that under CMI, inequality becomes persistent since poor
individuals do not have access to the same investment opportunities available
for the rich. Therefore, CMI harm the poor, and more speciÞcally lead to higher
inequality and lower mobility.
This line of research has received such widespread support that a recent
survey of this work concludes: [...] persistence of inequalities across gener-
ations is possible only if capital markets are imperfect (Aghion and Bolton,
(1992) p. 606). Certainly, both the economic and public policy literatures have
taken this argument for granted and based on this they have developed different
policy analyses (public education, education subsidies or taxation programs for
example).
A careful reading of this literature suggests that most of the existing research
in this area has been developed under the assumption that capital market im-
perfections are exogenous. Under exogenous CMI the credit limit is Þxed
and independent of the observable characteristics and decisions of individuals.
Therefore, by exogenous CMI we refer to situations where credit constraints
among poor people are introduced without providing any micro-foundations. In
some cases, for example, this credit constraint is taken to the extreme such that
agents can not borrow.1 Exogenous credit constraints are sometimes presented
by an exogenous and substantial wedge between the cost of borrowing and the
return on lending.2
In contrast to these analyses, this paper argues that when we endogenize
CMI, intergenerational mobility may be promoted among poor and talented
agents. In particular, recognizing that modern Þnancial markets are charac-
terized by a wide variety of informational imperfections, we endogenize capital
market imperfections by assuming an adverse selection problem between bor-
rowers and banks.3 To this end, we develop a growth model where agents are
heterogeneous in terms of inherited wealth as well as ability. There are two types
of agents; low ability agents and high ability ones. Young agents can undergo
private education, and the investment in human capital, which is divisible, may
be Þnanced by a loan market.4 Even though banks know the inherited wealth
1For example, Becker and Tomes (1986), Mulligan (1996), Loury (1981), Owen and Weil
(1998), Maoz and Moav (1999).
2See for example Galor and Zeira (1993).
3 In adverse selection models, the existence of equilibrium is an important issue. With
perfect competition among banks, existence is not ensured. See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
for an illustration of this problem.
4An example of the importance of the amount borrowed for education is the case of Amer-
ican law students. With rising tuition fees, students have borrowed more to pay for their
education. The sums that students are borrowing are much larger today than they were ten
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of each applicant they do not know the borrowers ability. In our model the
returns from the investment in education are random. Our central assumption
is that ability hjas a positive effect not only the success probability, which is also
the probability of repaying the debt, but also the return from the investment in
education.5
When banks cannot identify borrowers ability, they offer a menu of contracts
that satisfy the self-selection mechanism. In equilibrium, banks differentiate
between agents by forcing talented borrowers to make an investment in human
capital larger than they would have done in the Þrst-best world. In this way
low ability individuals do not pose as high ability ones. In equilibrium, high
ability children from poor families get educated even more than they wish, so
that both income mobility and human capital accumulation are larger than in
the Þrst best world.
The related literature can be classiÞed into two different branches. The Þrst
one is when CMI are exogenous and the second when they are endogenous.
Most papers analyze exogenous CMI. This literature does not model the
reasons for the imperfections. Their underlying conclusion is that imperfections
in the capital markets represent a barrier to intergenerational mobility. The
intuition behind this result is that when borrowing is expensive, individuals
with low wealth have no longer access to the same investment opportunities as
individuals with high wealth. In this context, inequality becomes persistent and
intergenerational mobility decreases.
This literature assumes that borrowers and external suppliers of funds have
the same information about the borrowers choice, investment opportunities,
riskiness of projects, and output or proÞts. In practice, borrowers have sig-
niÞcantly better information than outside investors about most aspects of the
borrowers investment and its returns. For that reason, the second branch of
the literature endogenizes CMI by assuming asymmetries of information. To
the best of my knowledge, such literature typically uses a moral hazard frame-
work (see Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997), Banerjee and Newman
(1991), (1993)). None of these papers, however, introduce adverse selection in
the capital market to analyze intergenerational mobility.6
Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Piketty (1997) examine the interaction be-
years ago, even after adjusting for the cost of living. For graduates at many schools, cumu-
lative debts of $40,000 from college and law school have become the norm (see Chambers
(1994)).
5We assume that agents investing more in human capital receive a better quality of edu-
cation. This helps the students outcomes, so that he is more likely to succeed, work in what
he was educated in, and earn a higher income than if he fails and becomes uneducated. The
idea behind this assumption is that buying more education is equivalent to having a higher
probability of Þnishing studies and becoming educated.
6There is a good reason to be interested in the adverse selection problem. In my model,
adverse selection implies that the borrower knows the expected return and the risk of his
investment project, whereas the bank knows only the expected return and the risk of the
average investment project in the economy, and thus there may be no objective way to deter-
mine the likelihood of the loan repayment. In our credit markets the promised repayments on
loans differ from the actual ones because of the uncertainty concerning the borrowers ability,
namely the quality of the investment. This creates the risk of borrower default.
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tween wealth distribution and the equilibrium interest rate. Our model differs
from these, both in structure and results. Even though both papers study in-
equality, Piketty (1997) does not explicitly model mobility. In particular, his
model assumes that individuals do not differ in ability, and steady state mobil-
ity is random and independent of abilities. In contrast, in our paper, mobility
is a result of individuals choices given their ex-ante heterogeneity and banks
decisions. Another important difference is that poor agents are credit rationed
in their models, whereas in our model the opposite occurs since there is overin-
vestment among high-ability borrowers. The reason is simple. In their papers
risk neutral agents invest in their own projects. Agents with low internal eq-
uity go to the capital markets to get into debt. The expected returns on the
investments depend positively on the effort that agents supply, but effort is not
observable by the bank. The more the agent has to borrow, the higher are the
marginal returns to share with banks and consequently the less effort the agent
supplies. Since poor agents have no incentives to supply too much effort, banks
will react by rationing them.7 Thus, in this type of model CMI leads persistent
inequality.8
Our result, as we argue in more details in the next sections, is the oppo-
site. Accordingly, this paper contributes to the theoretical understanding of
the linkage between intergenerational mobility and CMI. Our results should be
taken as a complement to existing studies, not only raising doubts about the
consistent message, but also suggesting that further careful reassessment of
the interaction between CMI and income distribution needs to be considered.
The paper is organized as follows. We set up the model in Section2. The
equilibrium in the capital market is described in Section 3. The consequences
of asymmetric information in terms of mobility, inequality and education are
developed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Finally, an appendix contains all
omitted proofs.
2 The Economy
The economy is populated by two-period-lived overlapping generations of agents.
When individuals are young, they receive an inherited transfer from parents and
the ability shock is realized. Then, they make their economic decision whether
7Similarly, Banerjee and Newman (1993) show that imperfect capital markets and endoge-
nously determined wages could be a source of persistent inequality. In their model, moral-
hazard problems prevent poor agents from investing in large projects. However, Banerjee and
Newman (1991) assume an utility function unbounded below with respect to consumption.
This is equivalent to assume inÞnite liability, which implies that there is no credit rationing
at all.
8Aghion and Bolton (1997) focus on Þnding conditions under which there is a unique steady
state distribution of wealth. This condition is given by assuming rapid capital accumulation,
that is, total absence of credit rationing. In Piketty (1997), multiple stationary interest rates
and wealth distributions can exist because higher initial rates are self-reinforcing through
higher credit rationing and lower capital accumulation.
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to go to school or not (and how much to invest in schooling).9 Schooling is costly
since it requires a cost which is privately provided. There exists a loan market to
get into debt if necessary and it is characterized by an adverse selection problem.
The capital market is competitive.
2.1 Individuals and Human Capital Technology
The economy is populated by a continuum of families, indexed by j ∈ (0, 1] .
For simplicity, there is one member of each family born in each period t, so that
there is no population growth; the parent-child connection creates a dynasty.
Individuals differ in the initial wealth inherited from their parents and in their
ability.
Let θ denote an agents ability. Individuals can be either low ability, denoted
by θ type, or high ability, denoted by θ, where θ > θ > 0. The proportion of
low ability is γ and that of high ability is 1 − γ, with γ ∈ (0, 1). We assume
that agents know their own ability while banks know only the proportion of
individuals of each type, as well as the inherited bequest of each applicant.
Individuals are risk neutral. When young, agents maximize utility which
depends on the second period consumption, ct+1,and on the bequest given to
their child, bt+1. More speciÞcally, the utility function takes the form Ut =
zc1−αt+1 b
α
t+1, where z = (1−α)α−1α−α. According to this utility function, agents
allocate the Þnal wealth between consumption, ct+1 = (1−α)yt+1, and transfers
to his child, bt+1 = αyt+1. Hence, the indirect utility function is simply a linear
function of the wealth realization, Vt = yt+1.
The human capital technology, which is given by the function h(θ, It), is
stochastic at the individual level. In particular, human capital can take two
different values depending on the realization of idiosyncratic shocks. We as-
sume that in case of success agents become educated and earn a high return,
whereas in case of failure agents drop out from college and earn a low return as
uneducated agents.10 Banks are able to observe ex post, and without any cost,
whether the investment in human capital fails or succeeds. Hence, the returns
from the investment are given by the function,
hjt+1 = h(θ, It) =
½
heGθ if she succeeds with p(θ, I)
hu if she fails with 1− p(θ, I), (1)
where θ = {θ, θ} and I is the investment in education which takes values in
the interval [0,∞). As we will see later on, since the amount of investment is
divisible it can be used to convey information about the borrowers ability. The
returns from the investment in human capital are such that educated agents
accumulate higher human capital than uneducated agents, since he > hu ≥ 0
and Gθ > 1 holds. Notice that the human capital of educated agents is affected
9Since primary education is generally publically provided, education in the context of
this model is better interpreted as post-secondary education. For brevity, we refer to post-
secondary education as educated and someone who has a failed investment in education or
decides not go to the school as uneducated.
10The results remain unaffected even if we assume hu = 0.
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by talent through Gθ. Talented agents obtain more human capital since (Gθ >
Gθ). Moreover, a talented agent, by deÞnition, will succeed more frequently so
p(θ, I) > p(θ, I) is assumed.11 Therefore, ability affects the returns from the
investment as well as the probability of success.
Ability is not the sole determinant of the success probability. Investment in
education is the other factor that inßuences it. More human capital investment
results in a higher success probability but at a decreasing rate, so that pII < 0.
Moreover, talented agents have higher marginal returns in the successful state.
We formalize this reasoning with the assumption that ability and the amount
of investment are complementary factors in the production of human capital,
so it holds that pθI > 0. Thus, high ability people have higher total and
marginal returns in the successful state. These assumptions are common in the
human capital literature (e.g. Mulligan (1992)). More speciÞcally, we use the
probability function
p(θ, I) = B(θ)(1− e−I) and 1− p(θ, I) = 1−B(θ)(1− e−I), (A1)
where 0 < B(θ) < B(θ) < 1.
Note that if ability only affected the returns, and probability depended just
on I , we would Þnd that the full information contract is incentive compatible
at any level of inherited wealth. On the other hand, if ability affected only
the probability of success, the single crossing property would not be satisÞed.
Therefore we choose the formulation described in (1). Moreover, we have to
impose the following restriction on the exogenous parameters:
a
d
< 1 +
aB(θ)
dB(θ)
ln(
a
d
), (A2)
where a = B(θ)(heGθ − hu), and d = B(θ)(heGθ − hu). Assumption (A2)
represents a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that the full information
contract is not incentive compatible at any level of inherited wealth among
borrowers.
Agents live for two periods. In the Þrst period, individuals learn their ability
and receive an inherited wealth. The parental gift bt received by each individual
is publically known. This inherited wealth can be used either to Þnance educa-
tion, since education is privately provided, or to invest in the capital market at
the riskless interest rate R.12 Given the properties of the investment probability,
it is always proÞtable to invest in education.13
In our model, only a fraction of agents will borrow to Þnance their college
investment from a bank if necessary. Banks offer contracts that we denote by
11This is consistent with the empirical papers of Manski and Wise (1983) and Stinebrickener
and Stinebrickener (2001), which show that children with less acquired ability are more likely
to drop out from college.
12Note that even though we have conÞned our analysis to investment in education, we can
also apply this model to investment projects for potential entrepreneurs.
13The reason is that limI→0pI(θ, I)(heGθ−hu) > R, which implies that B(θ)(heGθ−hu) >
R for any θ ∈ {θ, θ}.
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ξ = (Ft+1, It), where Ft+1 is the interest rate charged and It is the amount
of investment in education. Some other agents have enough inherited wealth
to Þnance their investment in education and they thus become lenders. That
is, they decide to optimally invest the excess bequest in the capital market at
the riskless rate of return (see the subsection First Best Investment below). In
summary, individuals can either lend, borrow or not participate in the capital
market. If they lend (bjt > I) the second period wealth is
yjt+1 =
½
heGθ +R(b
j
t − I) with p(θ, I)
hu +R(bjt − I) with 1− p(θ, I),
where R is the opportunity cost of funds.
If they borrow (bjt < I) when young, their wealth is
yjt+1 =
½
heGθ − F (I − bjt) with p(θ, I)
hu with 1− p(θ, I).
We are assuming limited liability, so that when projects succeed agents become
educated and earn an income high enough to repay the debt. By contrast, when
projects fail borrowers are unable to repay the debt.
If individuals do not participate in the capital market they invest their in-
herited bequest, so their second period income is
yjt+1 =
½
heGθ with p(θ, b
j
t)
hu with 1− p(θ, bjt ).
We will see below that in equilibrium only agents endowed with a bequest equal
to the Þrst best amount of investment become self-Þnanced. All the others will
be either lenders or borrowers.
At the beginning of the second period of their life (when they are old),
the uncertainty regarding the investment is resolved. Afterwards, banks receive
proÞts and agents obtain their income, which is allocated between consumption,
(1− α)yt+1, and transfers to the children, αyt+1.
First Best Investment The Þrst-best level of investment, which is de-
noted by I∗, maximizes the expected returns net of the opportunity cost of the
investment,
I∗ ≡ argmax
I≥0
p(θ, I)heGθ + (1− p(θ, I))hu −RI.
The FOC is,
dp(θ, I)
dI
(heGθ − hu) = R. (2)
It is worth noting that the fundamental problem of the agent is to optimally
decide how much of the inherited wealth is invested in human capital and
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how much is invested in the capital market. Equation (2) represents the non-
arbitrage condition between human and physical capital. It tells us that the
current gross interest rate R equals the expected marginal proÞt of the invest-
ment in human capital. From (2) and A1 (which provides the functional form
of p(θ, I)) we can derive the Þrst best level of investment,
I∗θ = ln
µ
B(θ)(heGθ − hu)
R
¶
,
where θ = {θ, θ}. It depends positively on the return gap (heGθ − hu) and
negatively on the return from saving R. Since talented borrowers have higher
total and marginal returns in the successful state they decide to invest a higher
level in education, i.e. I∗
θ
> I∗θ .
When agents spend more than the Þrst-best amount on human capital, that
is, when there is overinvestment, the expected marginal proÞts of the investment
are below the riskless interest rate R. This means that agents are not investing
properly. By merely reducing human capital investment and putting the excess
bequest into the capital market at the riskless interest rate R, agents would
increase their expected wealth. Accordingly, agents with an inherited wealth
above I∗θ will invest the Þrst best amount and become lenders. When agents
invest below the Þrst best, and thus there is underinvestment, the expected
marginal proÞts of the investment are above the riskless interest rate. It will
be optimal for the agents to increase the investment in education until both
rates of return are equal. Agents with an inherited wealth below the Þrst best
investment are therefore the ones who become borrowers.
In the next section we study the loan market for these applicants. We start
by deÞning the contract and then we characterize the equilibrium.
2.2 The Financial Contract
Since banks know the bequest of each applicant, there is a submarket for each
level of bequest. As they are unable to observe θ, banks cannot discriminate
among borrowers at every bjt . Therefore, there is a continuum of contracts at
each level of bequest. We will begin by analyzing the contract conditional on
one speciÞc level of bequest. After that we will see how this contract is modiÞed
when the inherited wealth changes.
Banks compete in two dimensions:
i) The rate of interest charged, Ft+1 (one plus the interest rate on the loan).
ii) The amount of investment in education, It, so that the extent of the
loan is determined by the investment in education minus the intergenerational
transfer received, (It − bjt ).
Since the inherited wealth is observable the contract will be contingent on
the borrowers inherited wealth. Therefore, a banks offer consists of a vector
ξ = (Ft+1(bt), It(bt)) that speciÞes the interest rate, Ft+1, and the amount of
investment in education, It, for any level of bequest.
Under asymmetric information, agents with an inherited wealth bjt < I
∗
θ be-
come borrowers regardless of their talent and banks are unable to distinguish
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among borrowers of different abilities. Hence, banks offer the asymmetric in-
formation contract to these agents. As we have argued in the section above,
low ability agents with bjt ≥ I∗θ become lenders investing the Þrst best amount
I∗θ . Similarly, high ability agents with b
j
t ≥ I∗θ become lenders investing the
Þrst best amount I∗
θ
. High ability agents with wealth I∗θ ≤ bjt ≤ I∗θ do not have
enough funds to invest the Þrst best amount, and they thus apply to the capital
market. Since only individuals of type θ apply, the bank offers the full informa-
tion contract to all of them. Therefore, the asymmetric information problem is
only present for agents with bjt < I
∗
θ .
Once agents invest in their education, the project could succeed or fail. In
case of success, they become educated and earn an income high enough to repay
their debt. In case of failure, agents become uneducated and earn an income so
low that they cannot repay the debt. The borrowers expected utility is thus
given by their expected future wealth
Uθ,bjt
= p(θ, I)[heGθ − F (I − bjt )] + (1− p(θ, I))hu. (3)
[Insert Figure 1].
Indifference curves Uθ,bjt = U for the borrower are depicted in Figure1. The
interest rate (F ) is represented in the vertical axis and the investment in human
capital (I) in the horizontal one. Each Þgure is drawn conditional on a certain
level of bequest.14 Since we are assuming marginal decreasing returns on the
investment, the indifference curves are concave (see appendix B.1 for a proof of
this property).
As the returns from the investment in education are higher for type θ ,
the marginal rate of substitution between investment and the interest rate is
an increasing function of ability. Hence, high type borrowers are inclined to
accept higher increases in the interest rate for a given increase in the amount of
investment. Therefore, the indifference curves of a borrower satisfy the single
crossing property. This fact enables banks to offer a pair of different contracts,
where the loan size is used to reveal the ability of the borrower.
The utility increases in the southeast direction, where the quantity increases
at a lower price. The dashed line Iwθ gives us the Þrst best level of investment
for the low type. As established in the previous section, Iw
θ
is situated at the
right of Iwθ .
We assume a competitive loan market and a small and open economy, so
risk-neutral banks obtain their funds in a perfect capital market at the exoge-
nous interest rate R. Because banks offer contracts with limited liability, the
repayment is F (I− bjt) in case of success and zero in case of failure. The banks
returns in expected terms are given by
Πθ = p(θ, I)F (I − bjt )−R(I − bjt). (4)
14We will see below that the higher the inherited wealth, the sharper the slope of the
indifference curve for both types of agents.
8
Since the loan market is competitive, in equilibrium bank proÞts are zero.
The break-even line (Fθ = Rp(θ,I) ) of the bank in the plane (F, I) is downward
sloping (see appendix B.2.). Contracts above the break-even line provide pos-
itive proÞts for the bank, while contracts below it provide losses. The zero
iso-proÞt contour for high ability agents is below that of low ability agents (for
each level of investment the interest rate is lower for them because they fail less
often).
2.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium
We look for a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in a two-stage game. In the Þrst
stage, each bank announces a pair of contracts {ξθ, ξθ} = {(Fθ, Iθ), (Fθ, Iθ)}, for
each level of bequest. In the second stage, borrowers simply select their most
preferred loan contract from the set of all contracts offered by banks.
We allow for free entry so that an additional bank could always enter if
a proÞtable contracting opportunity existed. For simplicity, we assume that a
borrower can apply to only one bank during the period under consideration.
Due to perfect competition, banks take others banks offers as given.
Under these conditions, an equilibrium in a competitive market is a set of
contracts such that:
i) Each contract {ξθ, ξθ} guarantees nonnegative proÞts for the bank.
ii) Contracts announcements are incentive compatible in the presence of
others announced contracts, that is, for any bjt < I
∗
θ
p(θ, Iθ)[(h
eGθ − hu)− Fθ(Iθ − bjt)] ≥ p(θ, Iθ)[(heGθ − hu)− F θ(Iθ − bjt )] ,
(5)
p(θ, Iθ)[(h
eGθ − hu)− F θ(Iθ − bjt )] ≥ p(θ, Iθ)[(heGθ − hu)− Fθ(Iθ − bjt )]. (6)
iii) No bank has an incentive to offer an alternative set of proÞtable, incentive
compatible contracts.
In part ii) we have introduced the incentive compatibility constraint as a
restriction. Banks are unable to directly distinguish among borrowers. They
can do so only by offering a pair (ξθ, ξθ) of different credit contracts that acts as
a self-selection mechanism. These restrictions force borrowers to make choices
in such a way that they reveal their types.
2.4 Discussion of Modeling Assumptions
The model assumes that parents obtain utility from bequests. This simpliÞes
the dynamics of the model and allow us to obtain a closed-form solution. As-
suming that parents were altruistic towards their children (i.e. they value the
utility of their offspring) would substantially complicate the model. Under this
assumption our model would need to be solved using a signaling framework.
In our model, banks compete in price and in quantities. Bose and Cothren
(1997) and Becivenga and Smith (1993) use the interest rate, the amount of the
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loan, and the probability of rationing as instruments of the Þnancial contract . In
their models, lenders use credit rationing as a response to the adverse selection
problem. The pivotal modeling difference between their analyses and ours is
that in their models each borrower receives the same amount of investment. As
a result, lenders can not discriminate with respect to the amount of investment
or the interest rate (since there is perfect competition) and use credit rationing
as the instrument to differentiate among agents. Note that the introduction of
the probability of rationing as another instrument could easily be incorporated
into our paper. In fact, our results do not change since everybody receives the
loan and the distortion is still given by the amount of investment.
Besanko and Thakor (1987a; 1987b), and Bester (1985) use collateral as an
instrument. The only role of collateral is to allow for self-selection of borrowers.
In our model the loan size is variable, that is, I is divisible, and this helps us to
separate borrowers at any level of inherited wealth. Therefore, when loans are
of variable size, no collateral is required anymore.
3 The Equilibrium Contracts
In the next subsections we analyze the behavior of banks and borrowers. To
provide a benchmark against which to measure the effects of information asym-
metries, we Þrst consider the equilibrium when there is full information.
3.1 Full Information
For any agent with an inherited wealth bjt < I
∗
θ the bank solves the following
problem: maximize a borrowers expected utility given by (3) subject to the
participation constraint for the bank, equation (4), which holds with equality
given the hypothesis of free entry and perfect competition among banks. It is
straightforward to verify that for any high ability agent with wealth bjt < I
∗
θ
,
and any less able applicant with bjt < I
∗
θ , the equilibrium contract is given by
ξ∗ = {ξ∗θ, ξ∗θ} with
ξ∗θ = (F
∗
θ , I
∗
θ ) =
µ
R
p(θ, I∗θ )
, ln
µ
B(θ)(heGθ − hu)
R
¶¶
,
where θ = {θ, θ}.15 This equilibrium contract is depicted in Figure 1.
The interest rates charged to borrowers are entirely determined by the op-
portunity cost of funds and success probabilities. Therefore, the equilibrium
contract ξ∗ = {ξ∗θ, ξ∗θ} is independent of the inherited wealth. The indepen-
dence with respect to the inherited wealth is due to the risk neutrality of the
agents. The implication of this result is that, independently of how wealth is
distributed, people within each ability type will always invest their respective
Þrst best amount of resources in education.
15Notice that the only contract at which there is no proÞtable deviation is the Pareto optimal
contract ξ∗ = {ξ∗θ , ξ∗θ}.
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High ability borrowers are better off than the low ability ones at any bt, since
they have higher returns when they succeed and they fail less often. Thus, it
is not a surprise that under full information banks provide talented borrowers
with better contracts (more funds at a lower interest rate).
Under (A2) the contract ξ∗θ is not incentive compatible. That is, if ability is
private information the contract {ξ∗θ, ξ∗θ} is no longer an equilibrium since the
low ability borrowers are strictly better off accepting the contract ξ∗
θ
. Therefore,
if a bank offers {ξ∗θ, ξ∗θ} under private information it will obtain negative proÞts.
The next section proposes the contract under asymmetric information.
3.2 Asymmetric Information
The equilibrium contract speciÞes the pair (Ft+1, It) offered to each θ type.
The equilibrium could be a separating equilibrium, where different types choose
different contracts, or a pooling equilibrium, where different types choose the
same contract. Arguments identical to those given in Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) establish that Nash equilibria are never pooling and any offer induce
self-selection of borrowers.16
Under asymmetric information the equilibrium contract is characterized by
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For any agent with bjt < I∗θ , the equilibrium under asymmetric
information (if it exists) is given by the credit contract ξ0 = {ξ∗θ , ξ
0
θ
} where
ξ∗θ = (F
∗
θ , I
∗
θ ) =
Ã
R
p(θ, I∗θ )
, ln
µ
B(θ)(heGθ − hu)
R
¶!
,
and
ξ
0j
θ
= (F
0j
θ
, I
0j
θ
) =
Ã
R
p(θ, I
0j
θ
)
, I
0j
θ
!
,
with I
0j
θ
given by
p(θ, I∗θ )[(h
eGθ − hu)− F∗θ (I∗θ − bjt )] = p(θ, I
0j
θ
)[(heGθ − hu)− F
0j
θ
(I
0j
θ
− bjt)].
(7)
[Insert Figure 2].
16 If pooling contracts are offered, then there exists another credit offer that is proÞtable
because it attracts only high ability types from the pooling contract. Hence, a pooling contract
is never viable against competition.
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Moreover, with asymmetric information ICθ > 0 (equation (5) is not bind-
ing), and high ability agents thus prefer the contract offered to the high type to
the contract offered to the low type.17
Low type borrower receives the full information contract. The banks incen-
tive problem is to deter θ type borrowers from choosing the contract of the θ
type borrowers. This incentive can be counteracted by making the θ contract
less favorable to θ type borrowers, i.e. by distorting the Þrst-best contract of
the θ type borrowers. This is the only way to ensure that the θ type will satisfy
the self-selection mechanism and will therefore not have incentives to choose the
contract for the θ type.
From Figure 2 (drawn conditional on a certain level of bequest) we can see
that the bank distorts the high type borrowers by providing overinvestment, in
that the amount of investment is higher than the Þrst best. As a result, talented
individuals are worse off under asymmetric information.
The intuition behind this overinvestment result is as follows: the interest
rate is the instrument used to ensure the zero proÞt condition. Hence, the only
way banks can sort out borrowers is by adjusting the investment level. Because
the marginal rate of substitution between investment and the interest rate is an
increasing function of ability, high ability borrowers are willing to pay more for
an incremental amount of investment.18 Therefore, investment can be used to
reveal the borrowers ability. Consequently, a contract specifying a suboptimal
high investment is relatively more attractive for talented borrowers.
[Insert Figure 3].
If a high type borrower has stronger balance sheet positions, the distortion of
the contract will be lower insofar as the amount of investment among high type
(I
0j
θ
) depends negatively on inherited wealth. The more a borrower invests in her
own project, the less her interest will diverge from the interest of the bank. This
greater compatibility of interest reduces the informational problem associated
with the investment process. Thus, the distortion is lower when the inherited
wealth increases, ceteris paribus. This can be seen by comparing Figures 2 and
3, where in Figure 3 the borrower has a higher inherited wealth than in Figure
2. The equilibrium amount of investment Ij
θ
in Figure 3 (rich agent) is closer
to I∗
θ
than it is Ij
θ
(poor agent) in Figure 2. Note Þrst that the level of utility is
increasing with the inherited wealth, so that as bjt increases, the utility moves in
a southeast direction. Second, from the Appendix we can check that the higher
the inherited wealth, the sharper the slope of the indifference curve for both
types of agents.
17 In fact, one can easily check that ICθ is monotonically decreasing in b
j
t . Moreover, using
equation (7) we can show that ICθ is positive when the bequest is equal to I
∗
θ . Therefore
ICθ(b
j
t ) > 0 ∀bjt ∈
h
b, I∗θ
´
. See appendix B.5 for the proof.
18This makes sense since it is precisely the θ type the one with a higher success probability
and higher returns from the investment in her education.
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In our model the riskiness of the venture, and thus the risk of default, is
determined not just by ability but also by the level of investment. Ability
affects the probability of failure. Moreover, under asymmetric information the
amount of investment among high type depends negatively on the inherited
wealth. Then, the interest rate charged to high ability types must decrease to
reßect the change in default risk. In fact, banks react by lowering the interest
rate charged to them (F
0j
θ
= R
p(θ,I
0j
θ
)
< F
∗
θ
). However, the debt repayment
(F
0j
θ
(I
0j
θ
− bjt )) is higher among high ability types. As a result, the high types
are worse off under asymmetric information even though mobility (as we will
see in the next section) will be higher among them. In our model, the welfare
cost of informational frictions are those associated with the presence of binding
incentive constraints, and these costs are borne by talented agents.
Clearly, since θ type borrowers receive the Þrst best contract they always
prefer to borrow than to become self-Þnanced. Because talented borrowers are
the ones who face distortions, they may prefer to refuse the contract and invest
only their inherited wealth in their education. However, in equilibrium these
agents choose to borrow rather than to fully self-Þnance their investment. In
fact, one can show that the higher the bequest received by an individual, the
more incentives she will have to refuse the loan.19 Therefore it is enough to
show that the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding for a high type
when bjt = I
∗
θ , which has been proven above.
Once we have characterized the candidate separating equilibrium we need
to be completely sure that there is no way to distort our proposed equilibrium.
That is, we need to check that no banks have an incentive to offer an alternative
set of proÞtable, incentive compatible contracts. By construction, no bank
has an incentive to offer any other contract which attracts only one type of
borrower. Thus, there is no loan contract that low ability borrowers prefer to
ξ∗θ which earns non-negative proÞts when only low types accept it. Similarly,
there is no incentive-compatible loan contract that high type prefers to ξ∗
θ
which
19 In fact it is possible to show that
∂Uθ,θ
∂bt
<
∂UA
θ
∂bt
, (8)
where Uθ,θ(bt) represents the utility of a talented agent when she chooses the low type
contract, while UA
θ
(bt) is her utility when she does not go to the capital market.
Moreover, we have previously proven that
∂Uθ,θ
∂bt
<
∂Uθ,θ
∂bt
, (9)
therefore by (8) and (9) we get the following result
∂
³
Uθ,θ − UAθ
´
∂bt
< 0. (10)
See Appendix B.5 for the proof.
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earns non-negative proÞts when it is taken by high ability individuals only. As
a consequence, an equilibrium exists if and only if no bank has an incentive
to offer a pooling contract. Since Nash equilibria are never pooling we need
to check under which conditions pooling contracts are never offered. If we
Þnd these conditions, our equilibrium exists and it is the one characterized
by Proposition 1. In a pooling contract the losses that banks suffer with the
contract offered to θ types are offset by the proÞts of the θ type contract.
Therefore, when the probability of being a low type is very small, the incentives
to have a pooling contract increase. Hence, proposition 2 tells us that in order
to have the separating equilibrium, the proportion of low ability agents needs
to be high enough.
First, assume that the exogenous parameters take the form
B(θ)
B(θ)
[1− h
eGθ − hu
heGθ − hu
] < ln(
heGθ − hu
heGθ − hu ). (A3)
Then, under A3 the following proposition holds
Proposition 2 Let ( eF, eI) be the pooling contract offered by the bank, V P
θ
(.) the
indirect utility function of a talented borrower applying for the pooling contract,
and V S
θ
(.) the indirect utility when he applies for the separating contract. Then,
if γ > eγ(bt = b) the following inequality holds:
V P
θ
( eF (γ), eI(γ), p(θ, eI(γ)), bjt) < V Sθ (F 0jθ , I 0jθ (bjt ), p(θ, I0jθ ), bjt ), (11)
for bjt ∈ [b, I∗θ ) with b being the lowest possible level of inherited wealth, and the
equilibrium is the separating one.
Notice that this proposition extends the result found by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976). In their model all agents have the same amount of initial wealth.
They found that when the proportion of low ability borrowers is higher than a
certain threshold level, the separating equilibrium exists. By contrast, in our
model agents differ also in the inherited wealth which is endogenously provided.
Consequently, our threshold level depends on the inherited wealth, eγ(bt), and
more speciÞcally, it decreases with inherited wealth. Therefore, if we guarantee
the existence of equilibrium for the lowest level of bequest (as we will see later,
this is given by b = αhu) we have equilibrium for higher levels.
3.3 Discussion
Our result that there is overinvestment is in contrast to the conventional un-
derinvestment outcome implicit in the microeconomic literature that analyses
adverse selection between banks and borrowers.
It is worthwhile considering the differences in terms of assumptions and
results between the work by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and our paper. In their
paper credit rationing appears because the expected return received by the bank
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decreases at some point with the rate of interest charged to borrowers. This is
due to an adverse selection effect which appears when a rise in the interest
rate changes the mix of applicants in an adverse way in that safe potential
borrowers drop out of the market, lowering the average quality of borrowers.
In our model, by contrast, an increase in interest rates will decrease (instead
of increase) the average risk (or similarly increase the average ability) of the
population of borrowers. Thus, in our model the marginal project Þnanced (that
for which the borrower is indifferent between applying to the capital market or
becoming self Þnanced) has the lowest success probability, whereas in the Stiglitz
and Weiss model it has the highest. Therefore, in Stiglitz and Weiss model the
bank may prefer to reject some borrowers instead of increasing the interest rate.
They obtain pure credit rationing since some individuals obtain loans whereas
apparently identical individuals who are willing to borrow on precisely the same
terms do not.
One crucial assumption behind the underinvestment result is that in Stiglitz
and Weiss all borrowers have the same expected proÞts but the dispersion of
the proÞts is different, whereas in our model the expected proÞts differ among
borrowers (in fact, talented borrowers have higher expected proÞts than less
able ones at any bjt ). Another important assumption for having credit rationing
is that in their model debt contracts are imposed exogenously and the contract
therefore does not allow for any sorting mechanism to be constructed in such
a way that each type of borrower will choose a speciÞc type of contract. By
contrast, in our model self-selection of borrowers will result from product dif-
ferentiation since the loan size differs among agents, and thus could be used
to separate out agents. And if separation is complete, rationing can no longer
occur.
Our overinvestment result depends on a number of assumptions, though the
key appears to be the complementarity between ability and the investment as
well as the assumption that ability positively affects the returns from the in-
vestment in education. There are some papers where borrowers overinvest in
equilibrium. Besanko and Thakor (1987a) Þnd that lower risk borrowers get
more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information. The ba-
sic assumption generating this result is that the marginal rate for substitution
between investment and interest rate is an increasing function of the success
probability. Our fundamental assumptions imply exactly the same. De Meza
and Webb (1987) also Þnd that borrowers invest in excess of the socially effi-
cient level. They assume that banks cannot determine whether an individual
consumer holds loans from other banks, and as a consequence the equilibrium
will be a pooling equilibrium rather than a separating one.20 Overinvestment is
20Rothschild and Stiglitzs (1976) proof that there cannot be a pooling equilibrium depends
on the assumption that borrowers can buy only one contract, an assumption which also holds
in our model. The implication of this assumption is, in effect, that the bank speciÞes both the
prices and quantities in the contract. There exists, therefore, price and quantity competition
among banks. As Rothschild and Stiglitz point out, the assumption that borrowers can buy
only one contract is an objectionable one. By arguing that there is absence of monitoring
purchases from banks, De Meza and Webb use a price competition framework and borrowers
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obtained because in their model an increase in the interest rate would decrease
the average risk of the population of borrowers, and credit rationing would con-
sequently never occur at the equilibrium interest rate.
4 Mobility, Inequality and Education
4.1 Full Information
The distribution of bequests in period t is given by Gt(b). As we have nor-
malized the mass of population to one, Gt(b) also represents the fraction of the
population with current wealth below b. We will show that the distribution
of wealth converges to a unique steady state distribution, independently of the
initial conditions, so that historical endowments do not matter in the long run.
In order to do that, we need to deÞne the way in which bequests evolve.
The agents optimal decisions (see subsection 3.1) and the stochastic process
of the shocks (ability and investment shocks) determine the Markov process of
bequests. With full information the bequest follows a linear Markov process
of the form bjt+1 = αy
j
t+1, where the realized income is given by the equations
written below. The investment in education can be successful (an event that
occurs with probability p = p(θ, I∗
θ
) if agents are of high ability), or can be
unsuccessful (an event that occurs with probability 1−p = 1−p(θ, I∗
θ
) if agents
are of high ability). The law of motion of bequest is given by the equations
below.
With probability (1−γ)p we deal with successful high ability agents, so the
bequests evolve as:
bjt+1 = g(b
j
t , θ, p) =
(
α[heGθ +R(b
j
t − I∗θ )] if b
j
t ≥ I∗θ
α[heGθ − F∗θ (I∗θ − b
j
t)] if b
j
t < I
∗
θ
.
(12)
where the third argument in the function g() indicates that the agent has suc-
ceeded. With probability (1 − γ)(1 − p) we deal with defaulting high ability
agents, so the bequests evolve as:
bjt+1 = g(b
j
t , θ, 1− p) =
(
α[hu +R(bjt − I∗θ )] if b
j
t ≥ I∗θ
αhu if bjt < I
∗
θ
.
(13)
where the third argument in the function g() indicates that the agent has not
succeeded. With probability γp we deal with successful low ability agents, so
the bequests evolve as:
bjt+1 = g(b
j
t , θ, p) =
(
α[heGθ +R(b
j
t − I∗θ )] if bjt ≥ I∗θ
α[heGθ − F ∗θ (I∗θ − bjt)] if bjt < I∗θ ,
(14)
are thus allowed to buy arbitrary multiples of contracts offered.
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and Þnally, with probability γ(1−p) we deal with defaulting low ability agents,
thus the bequests evolve as:
bjt+1 = g(b
j
t , θ, 1− p) =
(
α[hu +R(bjt − I∗θ )] if bjt ≥ I∗θ
αhu if bjt < I
∗
θ .
(15)
Note that the functions g are time independent.
[Insert Figure 4].
The graph of the law of motion of the bequest with full information is given in
Figure 4. Here we draw the transition function for a high type agent (equations
12 and 13) and a low type agent (equations 14 and 15). On the horizontal axis
we have the inherited wealth, bt, and on the vertical axis the bequest given to
the child, bt+1.
DeÞne the highest possible wealth of an uneducated agent as x = α[hu +
R(b− I∗θ )]. This is the second period income of a low ability agent who invests
the optimal amount I∗θ in education and fails. In particular, this individual
receives the highest possible bequest, b, and she invests the excess of capital
(b− I∗θ ) in the capital market. Similarly, let us deÞne the lowest possible wealth
of an educated agent as z = α[heGθ − F ∗θ (I∗θ − b)]. Note that both x and z do
not change under asymmetric information. We assume that x is smaller than
z. In turn, we restrict our attention to parameter values such that one-period
catch-up in terms of income between very poor (i.e., agents endowed with a
very low bequest) but educated agents and very rich but uneducated agents is
possible. This assumption will be very useful when we endogenously compute
the probability of upward and downward mobility.
The highest sustainable wealth for a high type is b = α1−αR [h
eGθ −RI∗θ ].21
The lowest sustainable wealth is given by b = αhu. We assume that
αR < 1. (A4)
Because A4 holds, if the inherited wealth is smaller than or equal to b it can
never exceed b at any time. Likewise, if the inherited wealth is greater or equal
to b the wealth of the dynasty will become less than or equal to b. Therefore,
we restrict our analysis to the interval β = [b, b] and deÞne the support of the
distribution of bequest in this interval.
Given that there is a continuum of agents and that both ability and the re-
turns from the investment are i.i.d. random variables, the distribution function
of the aggregate wealth can be interpreted as a deterministic variable by the
law of large numbers. The bequest distribution Gt+1 in period t+1 is obtained
from the distribution in period t by adding up the total mass of agents who end
up with a bequest less than bt+1. Therefore, the bequest distribution Gt+1(b)
21Note that in order to have b > I∗
θ
,we need αheGθ > I
∗
θ
.
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evolves over time as dictated by the following functional equation:
Gt+1(b) = γ[(1− p)
φ(b,θ,0)Z
b
dGt(b) + p
φ(b,θ,1)Z
b
dGt(b)]
+(1− γ)[(1− p)
φ(b,θ,0)Z
b
dGt(b) + p
φ(b,θ,1)Z
b
dGt(b)], (16)
where φ(b, θ, 1) = g−1(bt+1, θ, 1). More precisely, φ(b, θ, 1) = {b ≥ 0 such that
g(bt, θ, δ) ≤ b}.
We can prove the existence, uniqueness and convergence of the invariant dis-
tribution with full information by using Hopenhayn-Prescotts (1992) analysis.
Picture 4 gives an intuition of this result. In our model the fact that everybody
has access to the capital market as well as the fact that everybody may fail
with positive probability allows the individuals within a dynasty to move along
the different values of the wealth distribution. When dynasty wealth may move
from any measurable subset [b, b] to any other measurable subset of [b, b] the
Markov process has a unique invariant distribution.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique invariant distribution GFI for the Markov
process corresponding to the transition function P (b, A). Irrespective of the ini-
tial wealth distribution GFI0 , the sequence (T
∗)nGFI0 converge to GFI , where T ∗
is the operator deÞned by (16).
Since shocks on individual investments are idiosyncratic, there will be some
inequality in the long-run, but this inequality is independent of the initial in-
equality G0(b). Thus, even though wealth inequality cannot be completely elim-
inated, in the long run all dynasties fare equally well on average.
We can easily compute the number of educated and uneducated people.
Anybody with second period wealth below x is uneducated. The number of
educated is agents is
1−GFI(x) = (1− γ)p+ γp = 1− p(Ut+1) = p(Et+1). (17)
We now deÞne intergenerational mobility among the educated or/and un-
educated. Intergenerational mobility is measured by computing the transition
matrix between these two classes, say p(j/i), i = e, u; j = e, u, where p(Ut+1/Et)
is the probability that an individual, whose parent was educated, becomes
uneducated. This is the probability of having downward mobility. Under full
information this probability is
p(Ut+1/Et) =
[(1− γ)(1− p) + γ(1− p)][1−GFI(x)]
1−GFI(x) .
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Similarly, upward mobility is the probability that children of uneducated parents
become educated. This probability is given by
p(Et+1/Ut) = (1− γ)p+ γp.
In our model these transitions probabilities are endogenous. If capital mar-
kets function perfectly, individuals invest in education until the expected rate of
return equals the rate of return on physical capital no matter what their family
background is. In other words, independently of how wealth is distributed, poor
and rich people with the same ability will invest the same amount. Therefore,
there is no correlation between inherited wealth and education, and thus the
events Ut and Et+1 are stochastically independent. Hence, the inherited wealth
does not affect the probability of becoming educated p(Et+1), i.e. p(Et+1/Ut) =
p(Et+1/Et) = p(Et+1), and likewise, p(Ut+1/Ut) = p(Ut+1/Et) = p(Ut+1). In
our model the only variable linking the periods is the inherited wealth. Because
the full information contract is given by the Þrst best, which is independent of
inherited wealth, we do not have any dynamics under full information, and thus
p(Et) = p(Et+1) at any t.
4.2 Asymmetric Information
With asymmetric information the distribution of wealth matters for analyzing
mobility. Thus, aggregate statistics (output and aggregate human capital) do
not depend only on the types of agents and the investment cost in education, but
also on the Þnancial situation of the agents (captured here by the distribution
of the initial wealth). What is important now is how wealth is distributed
among agents. It is worth remembering that the low types receive the Þrst best
contract, so the evolution of their bequests is given by equations (12) and (13).
In case of success, this law of motion can be written as follows,
g(bjt , θ, ·) =

α[heGθ +R(b
j
t − I∗θ )] if b
j
t ≥ I∗θ with (1− γ)p
α[heGθ − F ∗θ (I∗θ − b
j
t )] if I
∗
θ ≤ bjt < I∗θ with (1− γ)p
α[heGθ − F
0
θ
(I
0
θ
− bjt)] if bjt < I∗θ with (1− γ)p(θ, I
0
θ
).
(18)
Instead, when educational investment is not successful, bequests evolve accord-
ing to
g(bjt , θ, ·) =
(
α[hu +R(bjt − I∗θ )] if b
j
t ≥ I∗θ with (1− γ)(1− p)
αhu if bjt < I
∗
θ
with (1− γ)(1− p(θ, I0
θ
)).
(19)
Note that, when credit markets are imperfect, the equality between the
marginal product of human capital and the interest rate does not hold. As
we will see below, the correlation between inherited wealth and ability will in
fact have an important effect on intergenerational mobility. Because of this
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correlation, (18) and (19) for the high type and equations (12) and (13) for the
low type deÞne a non-linear aggregate transition function Gt+1(Gt).
The graph of the law of motion of the bequests with asymmetric information
is very similar to the one under full information.22 The only thing that changes
is the bequest function for high ability agents with wealth bjt < I
∗
θ . This new
bequest function is below the full information one. Since the distortion is higher
at low levels of inherited wealth, the gap between the bequest function with full
and asymmetric information is higher in this range. The bequest function is
upward sloping but steeper with asymmetric information.
The aggregate bequests distribution satisÞes
Gt+1(b) = γ[(1− p)
φ(b,θ,0)Z
b
dGt(b) + p
φ(b,θ,1)Z
b
dGt(b)]
+(1− γ)[
φ(b,θ,0)Z
b
(1− p0)dGt(b) +
φ(b,θ,1)Z
b
p0dGt(b)], (20)
with φ(b, θ, ·) = {b ≥ 0 such that g(bt, θ, 0) ≤ b} and p0 = p(θ, I0θ(bt)).
Using the same argument as with full information, we can prove the existence
of an invariant distribution of bequests, GAI , where AI denotes asymmetric
information.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique invariant distribution GAI for the Markov
process corresponding to P (b,A). For any given GAI0 , the sequence (T
∗)nGAI0
converge to GAI , where T ∗ is the operator deÞned by (20).
With asymmetric information the number of educated individuals can be
computed using (20). Remember that talented agents with an inherited wealth
bjt < I
∗
θ will now become borrowers and their success probability will be different
than in the full information case. Consequently, the events Ut and Et+1 are not
stochastically independent and thus p(Et+1/Ut) 6= p(Et+1).
The number of educated agents is
1−GAI (x) = p(Et+1) = (1− γ)[
I∗θZ
b
p(θ, I 0
θ
(bt))dG
AI(b) + p(1−GAI(I∗θ ))].+ γp.
(21)
22Remember that a θ type receives the full information contract and that rich agents invest
the Þrst best amount. Hence, the law of motion of the bequest does not change either for rich
agents (regardless of their type) or for θ type borrowers (regardless of their wealth).
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We can compute the number of uneducated agents as,
GAI(x) = (1− γ)[
I∗θZ
b
(1− p(θ, I0
θ
(bt)))dG
AI(b) + (1− p)(1−GAI(I∗θ ))] + γ(1− p).
Comparing the probabilities of becoming educated under full and asym-
metric information, we conclude that since low ability agents receive the full
information contract and talented borrowers are distorted in equilibrium, the
probability of becoming educated among high ability borrowers is higher. Con-
sequently, the level of human capital in equilibrium is higher under asymmetric
information.
Proposition 5 In the steady state the number of educated agents is higher with
asymmetric information than with full information.
In terms of educational outcomes, in a more mobile society the probability
of being educated is higher than in a less mobile one. In our paper imperfections
in the capital market cause a distortion among talented agents since they invest
in education in excess the socially efficient level. This overinvestment enhances
the probability of success and causes higher upward mobility than with full
information. More speciÞcally, the next proposition tells us that the asymme-
try of information promotes upward mobility among talented borrowers. Note
that a formal proof of this results is not a simple task because the distribution
of wealth is endogenous and thus differs according to whether there is full or
asymmetric information in an economy.
Proposition 6 In the steady state upward mobility is higher with asymmetric
information than with full information.
Finally, note that this model is not suited to study the connections between
intergenerational mobility and cross-sectional inequality, since we Þnd opposing
effects making inequality very difficult to evaluate. In particular, poor and
talented agents are affected by the asymmetry of information in two opposite
ways. On the one hand, since the success probability is higher, there are more
people being educated. But, on the other, these talented borrowers have a lower
wealth.
4.3 Empirical Evidence on Credit Constraints
What empirical evidence do we have about the extent to which credit constraints
contribute to making inequality more persistent across generations? In order
to answer this question we need evidence that gives a precise estimate of the
extent to which credit constraints are likely to affect aggregate intergenerational
mobility at the macro level.
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Unfortunately, the empirical evidence that is currently available on the im-
portance of credit constraints in intergenerational mobility is sparse. Moreover,
the majority of the studies about credit constraints analyze whether borrowing
constraints affect educational attainment. Clearly, if borrowing constraints are
binding, then youths from families with less Þnancial resources (those with less
educated parents) will face a higher implicit schooling costs. The empirical ev-
idence is very contradictory. The typical view (see Kane (1994) and Ellwood
and Kane (2000)) stresses the importance of credit constraints for educational
attainment. The positive correlation between family income and schooling has
been widely interpreted as evidence supporting the idea that borrowing con-
straints hinder educational choices.
There are, however, a number of potential problems with this empirical
work.23 Recent studies by Cameron and Heckman (1998), Cameron and Taber
(2001), Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Shea (2002) have attempted to shed more
light on the determinants of schooling choices. Using very different methods,
these researchers have found little evidence that favors the idea that borrowing
constraints hinder college-going or any other schooling choice. For example,
James J. Heckman (2002) examines arguments about the strength of credit
constraints in schooling that are made in the literature, evaluating the avail-
able evidence and presenting new facts using American data. Heckman studies
the relationship between family income and college enrollment and the evi-
dence on credit constraints in post-secondary schooling. He draws a distinction
between short-run liquidity constraints, which affect the resources required to
Þnance college education, and the long-term factors that promote cognitive and
noncognitive ability.24 The latter emphasizes the long-run factors associated
with higher family income and is consistent with another type of credit con-
straint: the inability of the child to buy the parental environment and genes
that form the cognitive and noncognitive abilities required for success in school.
His conclusion is that long run factors are more important, even though he iden-
tiÞes a group of people (at most 8% of the population) who seem to be facing
short-run credit constraints.
It might be argued that borrowing constraints cannot have any important
inßuence on college attendance decisions, given the existing programs available.
However, the maximum Pell grant has generally been well below half of most
estimates of tuition, room, and board cost (see Kane, 1994). Further, an indi-
viduals grant cannot exceed a certain fraction of college expenses (set at 50%
during most of the time). Thus, the large range of subsidies to education alone
do not cover the entire cost of a college education. Therefore, we may conclude
that given the range of subsidies to education that only partially subsidize col-
lege expenses, there is no evidence of barriers to investment in education related
to borrowing constraints.
Contrary to the classical view our model suggests that, once endogenized,
credit constraints do not represent a barrier to investment in education, and
23See Heckman (2002) for an evaluation of the available evidence.
24Examples of noncognitive abilities are motivation, tenacity, trustworthiness and persever-
ance, among others.
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thus to intergenerational mobility. Our conclusions, therefore, are consistent
with the new assessment of the limited role of short-run credit constraints.
However, further empirical work and the use of richer panel data sets is needed
to shed light on these issues.
5 Conclusions
There is a conventional view (see authors like Becker and Tomes (1981), Loury
(1981), Galor and Zeira (1993)) that CMI represent a barrier to intergenerational
mobility. However, this branch of the literature assumes that CMI are exogenous
and thus there is no microfoundation about the imperfections in the capital
market.
In contrast to these analyses this paper tries to address the following ques-
tions: To what extent and through what mechanism do asymmetries of infor-
mation between borrowers and banks affect inequality and intergenerational
mobility? Is the nature of CMI important for understanding inequality and
mobility? That is, are these previous results sensitive to the way we model im-
perfections in the capital market? What we do in this paper is study inequality
and mobility in a model where CMI are endogenous. To this end we construct
a growth model with adverse selection problems in the Þnancial sector.
The major results of this paper might be summarized as follows: endogenous
CMI may promote intergenerational mobility among talented individuals, since
talented children from poor families get educated even more that they wish,
so that both income mobility and human capital accumulation are larger than
in the Þrst best world. In this way, low ability individuals do not prefer the
contract offered to the high ability ones.
Our main conclusion is that the nature of CMI is crucial to understanding
its effects on intergenerational mobility.
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7 Appendix
Appendix A: Proof of propositions.
Proof of Proposition 1.
First, we have to prove that in any separating equilibrium the low ability
borrower receives the full information efficient contract, ξ∗θ = (F∗θ , I
∗
θ ). This
contract must be on the zero proÞt line, and thus F∗θ =
R
p(θ,I) . Any Iθ 6= I∗θ
is strictly worse for the agent, and then it would be possible for the bank to
Pareto improve it. Therefore, the only equilibrium contract for the low type is
ξ∗θ .
Secondly, in any separating equilibrium, high ability borrowers accept the
contract ξj´
θ
= (F j´
θ
, I j´
θ
) where I j´
θ
satisÞes the incentive compatibility constraint
for a low type with equality.
25
The contract ξ j´
θ
is found at the intersection of the θ indifference curve that
passes through ξ∗θ and the line F
j´
θ
= R
p(θ,I)
. There is also no contract that could
make the borrower of type θ better off than ξ
0j
θ
without either rendering losses
to the bank or attracting the borrower of type θ from ξ∗θ. Hence, any equilibrium
must satisfy the conditions of the Proposition 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The only possibility to disturb the contract is by offering a pooling one.
Moreover it must also attract type θ agents, so that there exists an amount of
investment eI satisfying
V P
θ
( eF, eI, p(θ, eI), bjt) ≥ V Sθ (F 0jθ , I 0jθ (bjt ), p(θ, I0jθ ), bjt ) for bt ∈ [b, I∗θ ).
In other words, there is no pooling contract that attracts all borrowers and
earns a nonnegative expected proÞt if and only if (11) is satisÞed.
The proof proceeds in Þve steps.
Step 1. Pooling contract for a θ type.
Such a contract must obviously earn non-negative proÞts, i.e. eF ≥ Rgp(θ,I)
with gp(θ, I) = [γB(θ) + (1 − γ)B(θ)](1 − e−eI). The most preferred pooling
contract, for a θ type, that is consistent with nonnegative expected proÞts for
the bank has eF = Rgp(θ,I) and selects eI such that
eI ≡ argmaxeI {p(θ, eI)[heGθ − eF (eI − bjt)] + (1− p(θ, eI)hu}.
By FOC the amount of investment is,
eI = lnÃ [γB(θ) + (1− γ)B(θ)](heGθ − hu)
R
!
.
Step 2. The indirect utility function of a high type under the pooling con-
tract, V P
θ
, is decreasing in the proportion of low ability γ.
If the pooling contract ( eF , eI) is accepted by a talented borrower, her utility
function is
V P
θ
= p(θ, eI)[(heGθ − hu)− eF (eI − bjt)] + hu,
By substituting the contract ( eF, eI) in the expression above, and taking the
derivative we obtain,
dV P
θ
dγ
= B(θ)[e−eI(heGθ − hu)− eF ]deI
dγ
−B(θ)d
eF
dγ
(eI − bjt).
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The sign of the derivative is given by two terms. The Þrst term cancels out
by the envelop theorem, and the second term is positive since d eF
dγ
> 0. As a
consequence,
dV P
θ
dγ < 0.
Note that under a pooling contract the higher the number of low ability
individuals, the higher the losses for the bank. Therefore, the higher is γ,
the lower the probability of distorting the separating equilibrium. Since V P
θ
is
decreasing in the proportion of low ability (γ), we can argue that there will exist
a eγ such that when γ ≥ eγ, type θ is better under a separating contract (i.e.,
V P
θ
< V S
θ
), and thus the equilibrium is the separating one. Conversely, when
γ < eγ, i.e. the probability of being a good type is high enough, V P
θ
> V S
θ
holds
and there is no equilibrium.
Step 3. In a separating equilibrium the investment in college education
for a talented borrower depends negatively on the level of inherited wealth, i.e.
dI0j
θ
dbjt
< 0.
From the equation (7), and using the implicit function theorem, it holds that
dI0j
θ
dbjt
= −
R(B(θ)−B(θ)
B(θ)
)
−[B(θ)e−I(heGθ − hu)− B(θ)B(θ)R]
=
βR(B(θ)−B(θ)
B(θ)
)
(1− γ)[B(θ)e−I(heGθ − hu)−R]
,
where β is the multiplier associated with ICθ(equation (7)), which is bind-
ing, and therefore β > 0. With overinvestment (that is I j´
θ
> I∗
θ
) we obtain
B(θ)e−I(heGθ − hu) < R. Therefore, dI
0j
θ
dbjt
< 0.
In fact,
β = (1− γ) B(θ)e
−I(heGθ − hu)−R
B(θ)e−I(heGθ − hu)−RB(θ)B(θ)
= (1− γ) B(θ)e
−I(heGθ − hu)−R
B(θ)
B(θ)
[B(θ)e−I(heGθ − hu)−R]
.
(22)
Step 4. The population share eγ changes with the inherited wealth. In
particular, it is decreasing with bjt .
By deÞnition eγ is implicitly deÞned by,
V P
θ
( eF (eγ), eI(eγ), p(θ, eI), bjt) = V Sθ (F 0jθ , I0jθ (bjt ), p(θ, I 0jθ ), bjt ) for any bt ∈ [b, I∗θ ).
Let us denote this equation by ` = V s
θ
− V P
θ
. By the implicit function theo-
rem deγ
dbt
= − d`dbd`
deγ . The denominator is positive since
dV P
θ
dγ
<0, and the sign of this
expression is given by the sign of the numerator
d`
db
= R(1− B(θ)
(1− γ)B(θ) + γB(θ)) + [B(θ)(h
eGθ − hu)−R]
dI0j
θ
dbjt
,
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From Step 3 we can rewrite this expression as
d`
db
=
R(B(θ)−B(θ))
[(1− γ)B(θ) + γB(θ)]B(θ)(1− γ) [−γ(1− γ)B(θ) + β((1− γ)B(θ) + γB(θ))],
where β is given by (22).
The expression below is positive:
x = −γ(1 − γ)B(θ) + β{(1 − γ)B(θ) + γB(θ)} = β(1 − γ)B(θ) + (1 −
γ)γB(θ){B(θ)e−I(heGθ−hu)−R
B(θ)e−I(heGθ−hu)−R − 1} > 0
Consequently deγ
dbjt
< 0. As a result, we need the maximum level of eγ(b) to
be 0 < eγ(b) < 1. Therefore, if γ > eγ(b) the unique equilibrium is the separating
one since the break-even line ( eF = Rgp(θ,I) ) does not touch the pooling area (this
region is given by the intersection of the indifference curves of θ and θ that pass
through the points ξ∗θ and ξ
j
θ
).
Step 5. Note that for eγ(b) = 0, V s
θ
− V p
θ
< 0. On the other hand, foreγ(b) = 1 we obtain that V s
θ
− V p
θ
> 0. Then, since the function V s
θ
− V p
θ
is
continuous in eγ(b), we apply the Intermediate Value Theorem (I.V.T) to argue
that there exists a level of eγ(b) such that 0 < eγ(b) < 1.
The value of eγ(b) is given by
p(θ, I
0
θ
)(heGθ − hu)−RI
0
θ
+Rb = p(θ, eI(eγ(b)))[(heGθ − hu)− eF (eγ(b))(eI(eγ(b))− b)].
(23)
Let us study the possible extreme values that eγ(b) may take. First, we
analyze the limit case when eγ(b) takes value 0. Then, limeγ→0eIθ = I∗θ and the
indirect utility function under the pooling contract becomes the indirect utility
under full information (limeγ→0V pθ ≡ V ∗θ ). Therefore, V sθ − V pθ < 0 because
the indirect utility under full information is always higher than the one under
asymmetric information.
Second, we analyze the case when in the limit eγ takes value 1. Then, limeγ→1eI =
ln(
B(θ)(heGθ−hu)
R
) and under A3 we obtain V s
θ
− V p
θ
> 0.
Since A3 holds, we have V s
θ
− V p
θ
> 0. That is,
p(θ, I
0j
θ
)(heGθ − hu)−RI
0j
θ
+Rb > p(θ, eI)[(heGθ − hu)− eF (eI − b)].
From the ICθ of the low type (equation (7)) we have
−R(I0j
θ
− b) = B(θ)(heGθ − hu){−e−I∗θ + e−I
0
θ}−RB(θ)B(θ) [ln( dR )− b].
After some substitution:
B(θ)e−I
0j
θ {(heGθ − hu)− (heGθ − hu)} < R ln(h
eGθ−hu
heGθ−hu ),
The only endogenous variable in this inequality is I
0j
θ
, and note that the
LHS is decreasing in I
0j
θ
. Then, if we substitute the value of I
0j
θ
with the Þrst
best contract for the high type, this inequality holds for sure for a level of
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investment higher than the Þrst best. In other words, once we substitute with
I
∗
θ
, the inequality above becomes true when A3 holds.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
To determine the existence of a unique invariant distribution G we need to
study the long run dynamic behavior implied by the transition function P (·).
This transition function is deÞned as follows,
DeÞnition 1 Let Σ denote the set of Borel subsets of β = [b, b]. A transition
function on a measurable interval A is a mapping such that P : Σ× β →
[0, 1]. That is
P (b,A) = P (bt+1 ∈ A/bt = b), for all Borel subsets A ∈ Σ,
where bt+1 = g(bt, θ, δ) and P (b, A) is the probability that the next pe-
riods bequest lies in the set A given that the current bequest is b.
In our model, the law of motion of the bequest deÞnes a Markov chain
with a transition function P given by
p(b,A) = γ[(1− p)IA(g(b, θ, 0)) + pIA(g(b, θ, 1))] +
(1− γ)[(1− p)IA(g(b, θ, 0)) + pIA(g(b, θ, 1))], (24)
where
IA(i) =
½
1 if i ∈ A
0 otherwise.
Following theorem 8.1 of Stokey and Lucas (1989), associated with any tran-
sition function on a measurable space (A,Σ) there is an operator on a probability
measure. For any probability measure µ on (A,Σ) deÞne T ∗µ by
(T ∗µ)(A) =
Z
P (b,A)µ(db), all A ∈ Σ. (25)
The operator T maps the probability measure onto itself, so that T ∗µ is
the probability measure over the state of the next period if µ is the probability
measure over the current state. The sequence of distribution functions of the
bequest {G}∞t=1 is given inductively by equation (25), where the distribution G0
is simply a mass point at the beginning of the time.
We would like to know if the mapping T is a contraction mapping, having a
Þxed point. Before that, however, we deÞne a stationary distribution of wealth.
DeÞnition 2 A wealth distribution G(b) on β is invariant for P if for all Borel
subsets A ⊂ Σ, one has the equality
T ∗G(A) = G(A).
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We apply Hopenhayn and Prescotts (1992) analysis of existence, uniqueness
and convergence properties of monotonic stochastic processes.
A. Existence .
Proof. The existence of an invariant distribution GFI for the Markov pro-
cess follows immediately from the monotonicity of P established in Hopenhayn-
Prescotts Corollary 4.
From this corollary, the only condition that has to hold is the monotonicity of
the transition probability P (b, .). In our model the transition function p(b,A) is
increasing in its Þrst argument b in the following Þrst-order stochastic dominance
sense: for all (b, b0)∈ β2, b ≤ b0 implies for any x ∈ B,
p(b0, [b, x]) ≤ p(b, [b, x]).
More speciÞcally we obtain
p(b0, [b, x])− p(b, [b, x]) = γ[(1− p){IA(g(b0, θ, 0))− IA(g(b, θ, 0))}
+p{IA(g(b0, θ, 1))− IA(g(b, θ, 1))}] + (1− γ)[(1− p){IA(g(b0, θ, 0))
−IA(g(b, θ, 0)}+ p{IA(g(b0, θ, 1))− IA(g(b, θ, 1))}] ≤ 0,
where A = [0, x]. Notice that it is negative since g(b0, ., .) ≥ g(b, ., .), and there-
fore I(g(b0, ., .))− I(g(b, ., .)) takes either the value of −1 or 0.
B. Uniqueness and Convergence.
Proof. The proof of the uniquess and convergence of GFI follows directly
from the Hopenhayn-Prescotts Theorem 2.
If the linear Markov process satisÞes the monotonicity property as well as
the following concavity property or Monotone Mixing Conditions (in short
MMC), then there is a unique and convergent distribution GFI .
The MMC or concavity property tells us that we can Þnd a point b ∈
[b, b] such that there exists an n ≥ 1 and ² > 0, such that in n good realizations
of the shock we have p(b, [b∗, b])n > ², and in n bad realizations of the shock we
have p(b, [b∗, b])n > ².
In our model, we can Þnd n = 1 and 0 < ² < 1 such that
p(b, [b∗, b]) = (1− γ)p for the low type and
p(b, [b∗, b]) = γp for the high type.
Similarly,
p(b, [b∗, b]) = (1− γ)(1− p) for the low type and
p(b, [b∗, b]) = γ(1− p) for the high type.
30
By deÞnition p and p are probabilities and thus limI→0 p = B(θ) < 1 and
limI→∞ p = 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.
As the success probability is decreasing in the inherited wealth, the transi-
tion probability P under asymmetric information is not monotonic in the Þrst
order stochastic dominance sense. As a result, we cannot apply Hopenhayn-
Prescotts Corollary 4. In this case, in order to prove the existence, uniqueness
and convergence of an invariant distribution we show that our transition prob-
ability satisÞes Condition M in Section 11.4 of Stokey and Lucas (1989). That
is
Condition M: There exists ε > 0 and an integrer n ≥ 1 such that for any
A ∈ χ, either pn(s, A) ≥ ε, or p(s, Ac)n ≤ ε,for all s ∈ S.
For any bt < I∗θ the transition function with asymmetric information is
p(b, A) = γ[(1− p)IA(g(b, θ, 0)) + pIA(g(b, θ, 1))]
+(1− γ)[(1− p0)IA(g(b, θ, 0)) + p0IA(g(b, θ, 1))],
where
IA(i) =
½
1 if i ∈ A
0 otherwise,
and p0 = p(θ, I
0
θ
(b)). If the wealth is b ≥ I∗θ , the transition function coincides
with the full information one (see equation (26)).
The complementary of A is denoted by Ac. If b ∈ A,
P (b, A) = (1− γ)(1− p(θ, I0
θ
(bt))) + γ(1− p(θ, I∗θ )) = 1− ε1 if b ≤ I∗θ ,
and
P (b,A) = (1− γ)(1− p(θ, I∗
θ
)) + γ(1− p(θ, I∗θ )) = 1− ε2 if b > I∗θ .
Similarly, if b ∈ Ac
P (b,Ac) = (1− γ)p(θ, I 0
θ
(bt)) + γp(θ, I
∗
θ ) = ε1 if b ≤ I∗θ ,
and
P (b, Ac) = (1− γ)p(θ, I∗
θ
) + γp(θ, I∗θ ) = ε2 if b > I
∗
θ .
Letting ε = max(ε1, ε2, 1 − ε1, 1 − ε2), we have that Condition M holds,
and Theorem 11.12 (which tells us about the convergence of the probability
measures) is also satisÞed.
Q.E.D.
Proof Proposition 5.
31
Since p(E)AI (or similarly 1 − GAI(x)) is given by the equation (21) and
p(E)FI (i.e., 1−GFI(x)) is given in the equation (15), it is easy to show that
p(E)AI − p(E)FI = (1− γ)
I∗θZ
b
[p(θ, I
0
θ
(b))− p]dGAI(b) > 0.
Since p(U)FI + p(E)FI = p(U)AI + p(E)AI = 1, then p(U)AI < p(U)FI .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.
The number of uneducated agents can also be deÞned as 1 − G(x), where
x = α[hu +R(b− I∗θ )] is the highest second period wealth of an uneducated
lender. Clearly, x could be bigger or smaller than I∗θ .
Let us Þrst consider x < I∗θ . In this case all the children of uneducated peo-
ple will be borrowers. Moreover, all talented borrowers (with inherited wealth
belonging to the interval [b, I∗θ )) will receive overinvestment.
We now compute upward mobility under full and asymmetric information.
p(E/U)AI = 1
GAI(x)
[(1− γ)
xR
b
p(θ, I
0
θ
(b))dGAI(b) + γpGAI(x)].
p(E/U)
FI
= (1− γ)p+ γp.
The difference is
p(E/U)AI − p(E/U)FI = (1−γ)
GAI(x)
[
xR
b
{p(θ, I0
θ
(b))− p}dGAI(b)] > 0
Analogously we can show that the result is unaffected if x ≥ I∗θ .
Q.E.D.
Appendix B.
B.1. Indifferences curves are concave in the plane ( I, F).
The expected utility of the borrower is given by
Uθ,bt = p(θ, I)[h
eGθ − F (I − bjt )] + (1− p(θ, I))hu.
and the slope of her indifference curve is
dF
dI
= −
dU
dI
dU
dF
= − [
dp(θ,I)
dI (h
eGθ − hu)− F (I − bt)]− p(θ, I)F
−p(θ, I)(I − bjt )
. (26)
When I = b jt the slope is not deÞned. The demand curve I = I(F ), which
is decreasing in the plane (F, I), is given by
dp(θ, I)
dI
[(heGθ − hu)− F (I − bt)]− p(θ, I)F = 0.
The slope of the indifference curve will be zero if and only if (F, I) satisÞes
the demand function. To obtain information on the shape of the indifference
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curve for points not on the demand curve, we differentiate the equation (26)
with respect to I and arrange terms as follows,
d2F
dI2
=
[−B(θ)e−I((heGθ − hu)− F (I − bjt ))− 2B(θ)e−IF ]
p(θ, I)2(I − bjt )2
−
[ dp(θ,I)dI ((h
eGθ − hu)− F (I − bjt ))− p(θ, I)F ][B(θ)e−I(I − bjt) + P (θ, I)]
p(θ, I)2(I − bjt)2
.
The denominator is positive, so the sign is determined by the two terms in the
numerator. Since pII < 0 the Þrst term is negative. The second term is of
uncertain sign, but includes the slope of the indifference curve as a multiplica-
tive element. Consequently, we know that where the indifference curve has zero
slope, that is, where it intersects the demand function, it must have a negative
second derivative. Thus, in the neighborhood of the demand function, the sec-
ond term cancels out and the indifference curve is concave. We know, however,
that the slope of the indifference curve can change sign only at the point of in-
tersection with the demand curve. The result, therefore, is that the indifference
curves are monotonically increasing until they reach the demand function and
monotonically decreasing thereafter (see Figure 1).
It is worth noticing that the single crossing property (that is dFdI |θ> dFdI |θ)
holds for every bjt < I
∗
θ . SpeciÞcally, in this region the marginal decrease in the
interest rate F that a borrower is willing to accept in order to receive a higher
I (to be near to the efficient amount) is higher for type θ . This implies that an
increase in I does less harm to the high type, which is the one that is distorted
in equilibrium.
Finally, we can easily check that an increase in the inherited wealth increases
the slope of an indifference curve at a speciÞc interest rate-investment point,
i.e. ddbt (
dF
dI ) > 0. Consider a borrower with ability θ; it is easy to check that
dF
dI |bjt>
dF
dI |bitholds for every b
j
t < b
j
t < I
∗
θ . That is, the slope is steeper for
a higher amount of inherited wealth. This means that the higher the bequest
is, the more inclined an individual is to accept an increase in the investment
for a certain reduction in the interest rate. Note that in the model money is a
substitute of intelligence.
Q.E.D
B.2. The isoproÞt line is a decreasing and convex curve in the plane (I ,F ).
The proÞt of the bank is
Π = p(θ, I)F (I − bjt )−R(I − bjt).
DeÞning the function F (I) we have
F =
R(I − bjt) +Π
p(θ, I)(I − bjt)
.
Because of perfect competition in equilibrium banks make zero proÞts (Π =
33
0), and thus the slope becomes decreasing
dF
dI
= −B(θ)e
−IR
p(θ, I)2
< 0.
The isoproÞt is a convex function,
d2F
d2I
=
B(θ)e−IRp(θ, I)(p(θ, I) + 2B(θ)e−I)
p(θ, I)4
> 0.
The break-even line for talented agents are on the left of πθ, since those
borrowers have a higher probability of success.
Finally, the break-even line F = R
p(θ,I)
satisÞes limI→0F =∞, and limI→∞F =
R
B(θ)
.
Q.E.D.
B.3. With full information contracts ICθ > 0 for any b
j
t ∈ [b, I∗θ ).
Notice Þrst that dICθdbt < 0, and
dICθ
dbt
> 0. Therefore, we just need to be sure
that in the limit bt = I∗θ , the incentive compatible for the high type is satisÞed
while the one for the low type is not.
For talented borrowers who inherit the Þrst best amount of investment, in
the limit bt = I∗θ the incentive compatibility becomes
ICθ
³
I∗θ
´
= 1 + ln(
a
d
) <
a
d
(27)
Since a > d, 1 + ln(ad) <
a
d is always true.
Q.E.D.
B.4. At any level of inherited wealth the investment is characterized by
maximum equity participation.
Under full information agents receive the optimal contract, and thus it is
always optimal to put all their wealth in the investment in education.
We know from proposition 1 that contract for θ agents are distorted, and
thus, they are worse off than under full information. The utility of the talented
agents are
Uθ,bjt
= p(θ, I
0
θ
)[(heGθ − hu)− F
0
θ
(I
0
θ
− I∗θ )] + (1− p(θ, I
0
θ
))hu.
We can see that the best thing to do is to put the inherited wealth in the
investment since
dUθ
dbjt
= [B(θ)e−I
0
θ(heGθ − hu)−R]
dI
0
θ
dbjt
+R > 0,
notice that since I
0
θ
> I
∗
θ
then B(θ)e−I(heGθ − hu) < R and dIdbjt < 0.
34
Q.E.D.
B.5. With asymmetric information, Þrst, high ability borrowers prefer the
contract offered to their type instead of the contract offered to the low ability
agents, namely ICθ > 0. Second, high ability agents with b
j
t ∈ [b, I∗θ ) prefer to
become borrowers rather than self-Þnanced.
Stept 1. It is eassy to see that under asymmetric information the derivative
of the ICθ is decreasing in the level of bequest. That is,
∂Uθ,θ
∂bt
<
∂Uθ,θ
∂bt
, where
Uθ,θ(bt) represents the utility of a talented agent when she chooses the low type
contract, while Uθ,θ(bt) is her utility when she choose the high type contract.
Sept 2. We can show that
∂Uθ,θ
∂bt
<
∂UA
θ
∂bt
, where UA
θ
(bt) represents the utility
of a talented agent when she does not go to the capital market. The utility of
a talented agent when she chooses the high type contract is
Uθ,θ = B(θ)(h
eGθ − hu)(1− e−I
∗
θ )−RB(θ)B(θ) (I∗θ − bjt ) + hu
Similarly, UA
θ
(bt) is given by
UA = B(θ)(heGθ − hu)(1− e−b
j
t ) + hu
Thus, it is easy to chek that
∂(Uθ,θ−UAθ )
∂bt
= B(θ)
B(θ)
[−B(θ)(heGθ − hu)e−b
j
t +R] < 0.
When bjt = ln(
B(θ)(heGθ−hu)
R
) we have that
∂(Uθ,θ−UAθ )
∂bt
= 0.
Notice that a borrower is an agent with bjt < I
∗
θ < ln(
B(θ)(heGθ−hu)
R ). There-
fore, −B(θ)(heGθ − hu)e−b
j
t > R and thus
∂(Uθ,θ−UAθ )
∂bt
< 0.
Stept 3. From stept 1 and 2 we obtain
∂Uθ,θ
∂bt
<
∂Uθ,θ
∂bt
<
∂UA
θ
∂bt
. Therefore,
∂Uθ,θ
∂bt
<
∂UA
θ
∂bt
.
Therefore since the function Uθ,θ − UAθ is monotonically decreasing in b
j
t ,
then it is enough to show that Uθ,θ(b
j
t = I
∗
θ ) > U
A
θ
(bjt = I
∗
θ ) to proof that
ICθ > 0 for any b
j
t ∈ [b, I∗θ ).
The value of Uθ,θ(b
j
t = I
∗
θ ) is
Uθ,θ(b
j
t = I
∗
θ ) = p(θ, I
0
θ
)(heGθ − hu)−R(I
0
θ
− I∗θ ).
Similarly the value of UA
θ
(bjt = I
∗
θ ) becomes
UA
θ
(bjt = I
∗
θ ) = p(θ, I
∗
θ )(h
eGθ − hu).
Note that the expresion of UA
θ
(bjt = I
∗
θ ) coincide with the value of Uθ,θ(b
j
t =
I∗θ ). Therefore, to proof that high ability borrowers prefer the contract for their
type and to proof that high ability borrowers do not become self Þnance is the
same. So we just need to be sure that the following inequality holds,
p(θ, I
0
θ
)(heGθ − hu)−R(I
0
θ
− I∗θ ) > p(θ, I∗θ )(heGθ − hu), (28)
From equation (7) we know that−R(I 0
θ
−I∗θ ) = B(θ)(heGθ−hu){(1−e−I
∗
θ )−
35
(1− e−I
0
θ)}. If we substituting this value in equation (28) we obtain
B(θ)(heGθ − hu) > B(θ)(heGθ − hu),
which always holds.
Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium with full information
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Figure 2: Equilibrium with asymmetric information
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Figure 3: Equilibrium with asymmetric information
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Figure 4: Individual transition function with full information
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